Abstract. In this paper, we determine the complexity of propositional theory curbing. Theory Curbing is a nonmonotonic technique of common sense reasoning that is based on model minimality but unlike circumscription treats disjunction inclusively. In an earlier paper, theory curbing was shown to be feasible in
Introduction
Circumscription [15] is a well-known technique of nonmonotonic reasoning based on model-minimality. The (total) circumscription Ö´Ì µ of a theory Ì , which is a finite set of sentences, consists of a formula whose set of models is equal to the set of all minimal models of Ì . For various variants of circumscription, see [14] .
As noted by various authors [5, 6, [17] [18] [19] [20] , reasoning under minimal models runs into problems in connection with disjunctive information. The minimality principle of circumscription often enforces the exclusive interpretation of a disjunction by adopting the models in which either or is true but not both. There are many situations in which an inclusive interpretation is desired and seems more natural (for examples, see Section 2) .
To redress this problem, and to be able to handle inclusive disjunctions of positive information properly, the method of theory curbing was introduced in [8] . This method is based on the notion of a good model of a theory. Roughly, a good model of a theory .
The precise complexity of curbing, for both model checking and inferencing, was left open in [8] . Note that model checking for propositional circumscription is ÓAEÈ complete [3] and inferencing under propositional circumscription is ¥ È ¾ complete [7] .
It was conjectured in [21, 11] that curbing is of higher complexity than circumscription. This is intuitively supported by a result of Bodenstorfer [2] stating that in an explicitly given set of models, witnessing that some particular model is good may involve an exponential number of smaller good models (for a formal statement of this result, see Section 3).
The main result of this paper answers the above questions. We prove that Curb Model Checking and Curb Inference are ÈËÈ -complete. Both problems remain ÈËÈ -hard even in case of total curbing, i.e., when curbing is applied to all propositional variables, and thus the list Þ of floating propositional variables is empty and no propositional variables are fixed. The proof takes Bodenstorfer's construction as a starting point and shows how to reduce the evaluation of quantified Boolean formulas to theory curbing.
The PSPACE-completeness result strongly indicates that curbing is a much more powerful reasoning method than circumscription, and that it can not be reduced in polynomial time to circumscription. Thus, circumscriptive theorem provers can not be efficiently used for curb reasoning. On the other hand, a curb theorem prover could be based on a QBF solver (see [10, 4, 16, 1, 9] ).
After proving our main result, we identify classes of theories for which the complexity of curbing is located at a lower complexity level. Specifically, we show that if a theory Ì has the lub property, that is, every set of good models of Ì has a least (unique minimal) upper bound, then propositional Curb Model Checking is in ¦ È ¾ , while Curb Inference is feasible in ¥ Ô ¾ . Note that relevant classes of theories have this property. For example, as shown by Scarcello, Leone, and Palopoli [21] , Krom theories enjoy the lub property. More specifically, in [21] it is shown that the union of any pair of good models of a Krom theory is a good model, too. This is clearly a special case of the lub property; in in [21] , this special property is used to show that Curb Model Checking for propositional Krom theories is in ¦ È ¾ . The lub property can be further generalized. We show that following less restrictive weak least upper bound property (weak lub property) also leads to complexity results at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy: Ì has the weak least upper bound (weak lub) property, if every non-minimal good model of ³ is the lub of some collection Å of good models of Ì . The lub and the weak lub property are of interest not only in the case of propositional circumscription, but also in case of predicate logic. We therefore discuss these properties in the general setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next Section 2, we review some examples from [8] and give a formal definition of curbing. We then prove in Section 3 the main result stating that propositional Curb Model Checking and Curb Inference are both ÈËÈ -complete. In Section 4 we discuss the lub property, and the final Section 5 the weak lub property.
Review of Curbing
In this section, we review the concept of "good model" and give a formal definition of curbing. The presentation follows very closely the exposition in [8] ; the reader familiar with [8] may skip the rest of this section.
Good Models
Let us first describe two scenarios in which an inclusive interpretation of disjunction is desirable. Models are represented by their positive atoms.
Example 1:
Suppose there is a man in a room with a painting, which he hangs on the wall if he has a hammer and a nail. It is known that the man has a hammer or a nail or both. This scenario is represented by the theory Ì ½ in Figure 1 . The desired models are , Ò, and ÒÔ, which are encircled. Circumscribing Ì ½ by minimizing all variables yields the two minimal models and Ò (see Figure 1 ). Since Ô is false in the minimal models, circumscription tells us that the man does not hang the painting up.
One might argue that the variable Ô should not be minimized but fixed when applying circumscription. However, starting with the model of Ì ½ where Ò and Ô are all true and then circumscribing with respect to and Ô while keeping Ô true, we obtain the models Ô and ÒÔ, which are not very intuitive. If we allow Ô to vary in minimizing and Ò, the outcome is the same as for minimizing all variables. On the other hand, the model ÒÔ seems plausible. This model corresponds to the inclusive interpretation of the disjunction Ò.
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Example 2: Suppose you have invited some friends to a party. You know for certain that one of Alice, Bob, and Chris will come, but you don't know whether Doug will ; it is also minimal in this respect. is another model of this property. Similarly, is a minimal model for an inclusive interpretation of and . The models , , and are not plausible, however, since a scenario in which Doug and only one of Alice, Bob or Chris are present does not seem well-supported.
In the light of these examples, the question arises how circumscription can be extended to work satisfactory. An important insight is that such an extension must take disjunctions of positive events seriously and allow inclusive (hence non-minimal) models, even if such models contain positive information that is not contained in any minimal model. On the other hand, the fruitful principle of minimality should not be abandoned by adopting models that are intuitively not concise. The idea of curbing is based on the synthesis of both: adopt the minimal inclusive models. That is, adopt for minimal models Å ½ Å ¾ any model Å which includes both Å ½ and Å ¾ and is a minimal such model; in other words, Å is a minimal upper bound (mub) for Å ½ and Å ¾ .
To illustrate, in Example 1 ÒÔ is a mub for and Ò (notice that Ò is not a model), and in Example 2 is a mub for and ; is another one, so several mub's can exist. In order to capture general inclusive interpretations, mub's of arbitrary collections Å ½ Å ¾ Å ¿ of minimal models are adopted. It appears that in general not all "good" models are obtainable as mub's of collections of minimal models. The good model in Example 2 shows this. It is, however, a mub of the good models and (as well as of and ). This suggests that not only mub's of collections of minimal models, but mub's of any collection of good models should also be good models.
The curbing approach to extend circumscription for inclusive interpretation of disjunctions is thus the following: adopt as good models the least set of models which contains all circumscriptive (i.e. minimal) models and which is closed under including mub's. Notice that this approach yields in Examples 1 and 2 the sets of intuitively good models, which are encircled in Figs. 1 and 2.
Formal Definition of Curbing
In this section we state the formal semantical definition of good models of a first-order sentence as defined in [8] .
As for circumscription, we need a language of higher-order logic (cf. [22] ) over a set of predicate and function symbols, i.e. variables and constants of finite arity Ò ¼ of suitable type. Recall that 0-ary predicate symbols are identified with propositional symbols.
A sentence is a formula ³ in which no variable occurs free; it is of order Ò · ½ if the order of any quantified symbol occurring in it is Ò [22] . We use set notation for predicate membership and inclusion. A theory Ì is a finite set of sentences. As usual, we identify a theory Ì with the sentence ³ Ì which is the conjunction Î ³¾Ì ³ of all sentences in Ì .
A structure Å consists of a nonempty set Å and an assignment Á´Åµ of predicates, i.e. relations (resp. functions), of suitable type over Å to the predicate (resp. function) constants. The object assigned to constant , i.e. the extension of in Å, is The circumscription of p in a first-order sentence ³´Ô Þµ with Þ floating is the second-order sentence [13] ³´Ô Þµ Ô ¼ Þ ¼´³´Ô¼ Þ ¼ µ ´Ô ¼ Ôµµ which will be denoted by Ö´³´Ô Þµµ (Ô and Þ will be always presupposed). Here Ô ¼ , Þ ¼ are lists of predicate and function variables matching Ô and Þ and Ô Ô ¼ stands for
The following is a straightforward consequence of the definitions. We formally define the concept of a "good" model as follows. First define the property that a set of models is closed under minimal upper bounds. 
Clearly the set of all models is closed. Further, every closed set must contain all Ô Þ -minimal models of ³´Ô Þµ (let Å ¼ ); the empty set is closed iff ³´Ô Þµ has no minimal model. We define goodness as follows. Notice that good models only exist if a unique smallest closed set exists. The latter is immediately evident from the following characterization of goodness.
Proposition 2.2 ( [8]). A model Å of ³´Ô Þµ is good with respect to Ô Þ iff Å belongs to the intersection of all Ô Þ-closed sets.
In [8] , it was shown how to capture goodness by a sentence ÙÖ ´³´Ô Þµ Ô Þµ whose models are precisely the good models of ³´Ô Þµ. Similar to circumscription, Ô are the minimized predicates (here under the inclusive interpretation of disjunction), Þ are the floating predicates, and all other predicates are fixed. Curbing is naturally formalized as a sentence of third-order logic, given that the definition of the set of good models of a theory involves sets of sets of models. However, in [8] it was also shown that curbing can be formalized in second-order logic.
In the present paper we do not need the formal definitions of ÙÖ ´³´Ô Þµ Ô Þµ in third or second order logic, but we are interested in the problems Curb Inference and Curb Model Checking as defined in the introduction.
Previous Complexity Results on Propositional Curbing
Recall that in the propositional case, a structure Å is a truth-value assignment to the propositional variables. The problems Curb Model Checking and Curb Inference were described in the introduction. In [8] it was shown that both problems are in ÈËÈ , and in fact can be solved in quadratic space.
Two possibilities to approximate the full set of good models by a subset are discussed in [8] . The first approximation is to limit iterated inclusion of minimal upper bounds. Let us define the notion of «-goodness for ordinals «. Thus, the inference problem is in the propositional case for finite constant AE as easy (and as hard) as circumscription.
Another potential approximation to curbing studied in [8] is to limit the cardinality of model sets from which minimal upper bounds are formed. Intuitively, this corresponds to limiting the number of inclusively interpreted disjuncts by a cardinal
The concept of closed set is defined by adding in the definition of closed set the condition " Å ¼ "; goodness is the relative notion of goodness.
Clearly, goodness ½ is equivalent to circumscription. For ¾, (i.e. Å is finite) the following result was proven:
Theorem 2.2 ( [8]). Over finite structures, for every
¾ a model of ³´Ô Þµ is good with respect to Ô Þ iff it is good with respect to Ô Þ.
This result, which fails for arbitrary structures, implies a dichotomy result on the expressivity of -bounded disjuncts: Either we get only the minimal models, or all models obtainable by unbounded disjuncts. Thus the method of bounded disjunction is not a really useful approximation.
Main Result: PSPACE Completeness of Theory Curbing
In this section, we shall prove that inference as well as model checking under curbing is PSPACE-complete. Intuitively, the problems have this high complexity since checking whether a model is good requests a "proof", given by a proper collection of models, which may have non-polynomial size in general.
That such large proofs are necessary has been shown by Bodenstorfer [2] . A support of a model Å in a collection of models is a subset ¼ containing Å such that
Note that every minimal model Å ¾ has a support Å and that all models in a support are good models. Furthermore, every good model of has some support.
Bodenstorfer has defined a family Ò , Ò ¼, of sets of models on an alphabet of Ç´Òµ propositional atoms, such that Ò contains exponentially many models (in Ò), and Ò itself is the only support of the unique maximal model Å Ò of Ò . Informally, ¼ ¼ , and the family Ò is constructed inductively by cloning Ò ½ and adding some sets which ensure that the ¡maximal model needs all models for a proof of goodness (see Figure 3) . 
Note that the left disjunct of¨Ò gives rise to six models, which extend Å Ò ½ by the following sets of atoms:
Informally, Ò ½ (resp., Ò ¼ ) represents the assignment of true (resp., false) to the atom Ò . The right disjunct of¨Ò generates recursively assignments to the other atoms Ò ½ , . . . , ½ , such that certain minimal models of¨Ò represent truth assignments to the atoms ½ Ò (see Figure 4) .
Note that Å Ò Å Ò ½ Ò (i.e., all atoms are true) is, as easily seen, the unique maximal model of the formula¨Ò. The set of models of¨Ò over Ø Ò , ÑÓ ´¨Òµ, defines the family Ò as described in [2] . Thus, each model Å ¾ ÑÓ ´¨Òµ is good, and Å Ò requires an exponential size support.
The set of models ÑÓ ´¨¾µ
Evaluating a quantified Boolean formula on ÑÓ ´¨Òµ
We now show that a quantified Boolean formula (QBF)
where each É ¾ and ³ is a Boolean formula over atoms ½ Ò , can be "evaluated" on the collection ÑÓ ´¨Òµ of good models exploiting the curbing principle. Roughly, the idea is as follows: ÑÓ ´¨Òµ can be layered into Ò overlapping layers of models, where each layer contains the models which are recursively generated by the left disjunct of the formula¨ . In each layer we have three levels of models. Neighbored layers and ½ overlap such that the bottom level of is the top level of ½ (see Figure 5) . The minimal models in ÑÓ ´¨Òµ are the bottom models of layer 1, and might be considered as the top model of an artificial layer 0. Similarly, the maximal model Å Ò in ÑÓ ´¨Òµ might be viewed as a bottom model of an artificial layer Ò · ½.
In order to "evaluate" the QBF , we will obtain a formula ©´ µ from by adding conjunctively a set of formulas ´ µ to¨Ò. Thus ©´ µ ¨Ò ´ µ. The formulas in will be chosen such that the overall structure of the set of good models of ©´ µ does not differ from the one of the set of models of¨Ò. In particular, each model Å of Ò will correspond to some good model ´Å µ of ©´ µ which augments Å by certain atoms that describe the truth status of subformulas of .
By adjoining ´ µ to¨Ò, we "adorn" the models in ÑÓ ´¨Òµ with additional atoms which help us in evaluating the formula along the layers. In what follows, we formalize this intuition. We introduce a set of new atoms Ø ¼
The following formulas are convenient for our purpose:
Informally, ×× tells whether the model considered assigns the atom legally a truth value. The formula says that the model is at layer or below. The formula £ says that the model is at layer . The models at the bottom of layer which are of interest to us are those in which ×× is true; all other models of the entire layer violate ×× .
At layer ½, we evaluate the formula using the following formulas: 
Ò.
We show the following An example of the construction of ´¡µ for the formula ¾ ½´ ¾ ½ µ is shown in Figure 6 . We now show that ´Å µ in (2.1)-(2.3) satisfies items 1-3 in the lemma. Obviously, this is true for (2.1) and (2.2). For the case (2.3), from the definitions of ´¡µ in (1) , we have by definition of
Finally, it remains to show that ´Å Ò µ is the unique maximal good model of ©´ µ.
As easily seen, every finite propositional theory which has a unique maximal model has a unique maximal good model, thus ©´ µ has a unique maximal good model Å ¼ . From the induction hypothesis, it follows that Å ´Å Ò ½ Ò µ is the unique
Since Å ¾ ´Å Ò ½ Ò µ is the unique maximal good model AE of ©´ µ such that AE Ø Ò Å Ò ½ Ò , we conclude from the structure of layer Ò, which has the lub property (see Section 4) , that Å ¼ is a mub of Å ¼ Å ½ Å ¾ . Since, by construction, ´Å µ is an upper bound of Å ½ Å ¾ Å ¿ , it follows Å ¼ ´Å µ.
This proves that the claimed statement holds for Ò, and completes the induction.
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We thus obtain the following result. 
Combined with the previous results [8] that Curb Inference and Curb Model Checking are in PSPACE, we obtain the main result of this section. 
The Lub Property
While curbing of general theories is ÈËÈ -complete, it is possible to identify specific classes of theories on which curbing has lower complexity. In this section, we identify a relevant fragment of propositional logic for which curb-inference is in ¥ È ¾ . As already mentioned in the introduction, Scarcello, Leone, and Palopoli [21] derived complexity results for curbing Krom theories, i.e., clausal theories where each clause contains at most two literals. They showed that Curb Model Checking for propo- 
Good Models and Least Upper Bounds
The lub property defined in Section 4 requires that all nonempty collections of good models of a theory have a lub. Let us weaken this property by requiring merely that for every non-minimal good model Å there exists a collection of models whose lub is Å. Notice that the lub property implies the weak lub property, but not vice versa. This is shown by the following example.
Example 5.1. Suppose the models of a propositional theory Ì are the ones shown in Figure 7 . All models are good, and Å ½ , Å ¾ are the lubs of , respectively. However, the good models and do not have a lub; thus, the theory satisfies the weak lub property but not the lub property.
Intuitively, if a theory satisfies the weak lub property, then any good model Å in a collection Å of good models can be replaced by a collection Å ¼ of good models whose lub is Å, without affecting the mubs of the collection, i.e., Å has the same mubs as ÅÒ Å Å ¼ . By repeating this replacement, Å can be replaced by a collection Å £ of minimal models that has the same mubs as Å. This is actually the case, provided that the collection of good models has the following property. Notice that in the context of circumscription, theories were sometimes called wellfounded if every model Å of a sentence ³ includes a minimal model of ³ [14] . That notion of well-foundedness is different from the one employed here.
The collection of good models of a theory is not necessarily well-founded, as shown by the following example. Proof. We show this by contradiction. Assume the contrary holds. Let be the set of good models which are not the lub of some collection of minimal models; note that is not empty. Since the collection of good models is well-founded, must have a minimal element Å.
(To obtain such an Å, construct a maximal chain in , and take the unique minimal element of this chain, which must exist). Since ³ has the weak lub property, Å is the mub of some collection Ë of good models. 
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The converse of this theorem (which is equivalent to the statement that a theory, if every good model is either minimal or the lub of some collection of minimal models, is well-founded) is not true. This is shown by Example 5.2. Furthermore, this theorem does not hold if the collection of good models is arbitrary. This is shown by the following example. In the resulting collection of models, which is clearly axiomatizable by a first-order sentence ³, every model is good and the lub of some collection of good models (Å is the lub of AE Å ·½ , and Å of AE Å ·½ ; all other models are minimal). However, no Å is the lub of a collection of minimal models. Notice that each good model is the lub of two good models and 1-good.
From Theorems 5.1 and 2.1, we immediately get the following complexity results for propositional theories. A possible attempt to strengthen the weak-lub property is to use ordinals. Say that the collection of good models of a theory has the inductive weak-lub property, if every non-minimal «-good model is the lub of a collection of´ «µ-good models. Notice that collection of good models in Example 5.2 has the inductive weak-lub property (which, as a consequence, does not imply well-foundedness). However, the following result is an easy consequence of our results from above. 
